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Abstract Memetic Science is the name of a new field that deals with the
quantitativeanalysis of cultural transfer.The units of cultural transfer are
entities called "memes". In a nutshell, memes are to cultural and mental
constructs as genesare to biological organisms. Examplesof memesare
ideas,tunes, fashions, and virtuallyany culturaland behavioral unit that
getscopiedwitha certaindegreeof fidelity. It is arguedthat the under
standing of memes is of similar importance and consequence as the
understanding of processes involving DNA and RNA in molecular
biology.Thispaperpresentsa rigorousfoundation fordiscussion ofmemes
and approaches to quantifying relevantaspectsof meme genesis, inter
action, mutation, growth,deathand spreadingprocesses. It is also argued
inthispaper that recombinant memetics is possible incomplete analogy
to recombinant DNA/ geneticengineering. Special attention is paid to
memes in written modern English. KEYWORDS: meme, replicator,
language, culture, copy, idea, evolution, computer, virus, knowledge,
artificial intelligence, brain, mind.
I. Memes and Replicators - An Informal Introduction.
In 1987 thebook "Engines of Creation" (EOC) by K.EricDrexler1
appeared. EOCprimarily espouses Drexler'svision of nanotechnology, a
technology of human-designed molecule-sized machines, a technology
based on the concept of replicators - entities that generate copies of
themselves. Allkinds of replicators surround us, themost rigorously (but
not necessarily, fully) understood replicators being RNA and DNA
molecules. Attention wasdrawn toa special kindofreplicator thatDrexler
loosely termed mental-replicators. The ideasof replicators and mental-
replicators were first articulated in a systematic fashion by Richard
Dawkins in hislandmark book "The Selfish Gene"2 (TSG) and later, in
more technical detail, in "The Extended Phenotype"3 (TEP). In TSG
Dawkins coined the word "meme" (pronounced 'meem' to rhyme with
cream) to describe a unit of cultural transmission or imitation.
While Dawkins and Drexlerprovided articulation and emphasis to
the concepts of replicators and memes, their discussions remain at the
qualitative,general descriptive level. However, in the same time frame,
Lumsden and Wilson introduced their conceptof 'culturgen' in order to
allowanintegrated discussion ofgeneticandcultural transfer. Theirtheory
is articulated in full mathematical detail in their 1981 book "Genes, Mind,
Culture" * (GMC), and in a more easily digested introductory book
"Promethean Fire"5 (PF) which appeared in 1983. Culturgen theory isa
very comprehensive theory that incorporates cultural transfer subject to
epigeneticrules. Epigeneticrules,accordingto Lumsdenand Wilson,are
the "genetically determined procedures that direct the assembly of the
mind, including thescreening of stimuliby peripheral sensoryfilters, the
intemuncial cellular organizing processes, and the deeper processesof
directed cognition". Lumsdenand Wilsonargue that their theorypredicts
that culture acts to slow the rate of genetic evolution, while joint
genetic-cultural evolution leads to major change in epigenetic rules over
a time as short as 1000 years.
The books EOC, TSG, GMC, TEP and PF set the stage for rigorous
understanding of cultural transfer in terms of tools successfully utilized
bybiologists.Duringthisgeneralperiod,thecapabilitiesandcorapellingly
powerful consequences of mass media started coming to the national
foreground. When one considers mass media in light of these soriobio-
logical and sociocultural tools, one comes to several realizations. One
inescapable realization is that it is entirely possible that many political,
economic, andsocialeventscanbe understood andpossibly controlled by
an understanding of the process of spread and replication of cultural
entities.
Paralleling the sociobiological and sociocultural trends, develop
ments and automated production of electronic storage media and com
putershavecontinued at an unrelenting pace.The paceof the computer
industry is placing powerfulcomputersand large cumulativedatabasesof
information and knowledge at the disposal of most inhabitants of the
United States and its economic and military allies. Developments of
computer chips such the Intel 80860 and Motorolla 88000 promise to
place supercomputer power in the hands of any middle class consumer
who wants that power. And, paralleling the understanding that many
culturalobjectscan spreadinan infectivemanner,wearebecomingaware
of electronic entities such as 'computer viruses' that can spread between
computersvia 'infected disks' and electronicnetworks.These computer
viruses and similar electronic artifacts share many of the attributes of
replicating cultural objects.
Given Dawkins' concept of memes and Lumsden and Wilson's
concept of culturgen, it is evident that more theoretical development of
the two concepts is required before one can utilize them in a practical
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manner. While the culturgen approach may be an entirely valid repre
sentation, a time scale of 1000 years (required by the theory) to test
predictions is too long.At thesame time,memeshaveonlybeendefined
as general constructs and lack a rigorous quantifiable definition. The
challenge is toutilize thebestofbothapproaches ina constructive fashion
thatcanbe unambiguously tested,and thenapplied.To thisend, I suggest
that, at least initially, one work with the limiting case of the culturgen
theory, where one dealswithgeneration, mutation, spread, and deathof
purelycultural entities.Thesepurelyculturalentitieswillbecalledmemes
sincetheyresemble Dawkins'memes(however, thememesin thisarticle
are not necessarily identical to Dawkins' memes).
Someof thegoalsof this paperare to: provide rigorous formulation
of theconceptof memes, discusstheutilityofusingtheconceptof memes,
and providea quantitativefoundationfor furtherwork and exploitationof
theconcept of meme. Sincethistopicis relatively newand thedesirehere
is to make this field accessible to a large community, the structure of
presentation will proceed by statements, informal discussion and then
rigorous discussion. Readers areencouraged toread thepaper first witha
view to familiarizing themselves with the terminology, scope, and
potentialitiesassociated withthissubjectmatter, andthentoreadthepaper
againtoextractspecificusefulcomponentsforfurtherconsideration. Thus
the terminologyutilized in the initial sections will tend to be informal;
terms such as meme and replicator will be defined and refined in later
sections of the paper.
What are some examples of memes? Common examples include
ideas, tunes, fashions,and virtually any cultural and behavioral unit that
gets copied with a certain degree of fidelity. Photo-copied documents
(Xeroxcopies)are primeexamplesin [modern culture] of embodiments
of meme replication. Chain letters, prayers, slogans and jokes, are other
(mass replicated)embodimentsof memes. An example of an extremely
potentelectronic meme is the computer-virus.
One typeof memethatgets reportedoften in the popularpress is that
ofcelebrity based ormovie-based behavior pattern. Shouler6 reports that
following the MGMmovie "TheHustler",whichdepicts the life of pool
hustler MinnesotaFats, "The industryeffects were overwhelming,more
than3000 new [pool]roomsshot up across the nation injust three years."
Anotherspecificexampleof a continuingly powerful memeis hair style;
notice the spread of [British]Princess Di's hairstyles. In order to avoid
gettingbogged downin thesemanticsof what is 'behavior' and what is
'meme', and where there may be similaritiesand where there may be
differences, this paper will focus on discussionof a particularcategory
of memes,namelythatof 'idea-memes'. In whatfollows,the terms 'idea',
'concept', 'meme' and 'idea-meme' will be utilized interchangeably. As
we proceed it must be recognized, though, that developing a theory of
'idea-memes' ispotentiallytreacherous. Manyopportunitiesforconfusion
exist. There may be situations where shifts of frames of reference can
occur, there are ample opportunities for unintentional substitutions of
general cases for particular cases, which may lead to Russell type
paradoxes[BertrandRussell typesof statementsabout sets of subsets that
don't include themselves, and a variety of self referential statements
discussed by Hofstader 7A9].
Historically, philosophers have dealt with the questions of theories
of knowledge, abstract ideas, existence of 'perfect forms' and universal
truths. Philosophers of all eras have concerned themselves with how
conceptsarise, theirrelationship to the physical world,and mind/body or
mind/matter questions. One of the uniform aspects of philosophical
theories of ideas and knowledge is the question of 'truth' of ideas and
concepts. Questions of truth naturally lead to questions of ethics and
morality. Indeveloping thetheory of memes it is important to stressthat
one isnot tryingto determinetruthof ideas.Truthand similarnotionscan
enter as parameters that can be used to describe memes, their interde-
pendencies, andtheirsurvival, spread, and 'death'; however, memes exist
regardless of theirtruthcondition. Consequently, theories of memes must
steerclearof general statements abouttruth, ethicsand morality.
It will be asserted here that there are useful aspects to the thorough
understanding of these so called mental replicators. In fact, it is quite
possiblethatwholeprocesses of development of science,philosophy, and
many other human cultural enterprises can be explored and perhaps
predicted from a quantitative theory of genesis, interactions, growth and
deathof memes.It is thisconvictionthatmotivatesone tosetout toexplore
and quantify what is known about memes and their interactions. This
activity of systematizing and quantifying properties of memes and
interactions between memes is what I term Memetic Science.
The remainderof the paper is organizedas follows:
II. Replicators, Vehicles, and Memes - Reintroduction. Here repli
cators, memes, and associated terminology that forms the linguistic
foundations,get more rigorousdefinitions.
III. Roots. In this section similar concepts exploredby others will be
visited briefly. While Dawkinswas the first to emphaticallyarticulate the
conceptof memesand replicators, othersbeforeandafter Dawkins'TSG
have come up with useful approaches that approximate and converge on
the meme framework.
IV. Population Dynamics and Replicator Equations. In this section,
thebasicpopulation equations are introduced. The population equations
are the modem version of the Voltera-Lotkapredator-preyequations for
competing species in an ecological niche.This section restson contrib
utions from Lotka10 , Volterra", E. Montroll12, R. May13, L. Cavalli-
Sforza14,15, Lumsden &Wilson,4"5 Schuster and Sgmund16, and Diedrich
and Opper17.
V. LanguageBasedMemes- Fundamentals.Herewe takeupthestudy
of memes that are manifested in language,and in particular in Written
Modem English (WME). The particular interest in WME is due to two
facts. First, Modem English is becoming the mostwidely used language,
especially in international communications. The second fact is that
developing memetic science by investigating WME allows a truly
scientific research approach based on unambiguous raw data which is
accessible to any individual. An interesting historical aspecthere is that
Markovstartedhis work in stochastictheoryby investigating statistical
attributes of language18. Similarly, Claude Shannon was led to many
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insights in information and communication theory by investigating
redundancy and coding ofEnglish language"; finally, Benoit Mandelbrot
of fractal fame started his professional work in study of statistical
distributions ofword frequencies21. An interesting observation here isthat
it isestimated that there are1,500,000 species ofplants and animals that
have already been described and named22, all of these names and their
descriptions are memes. Given that the wealth oflanguage based memes
exceeds that of the flora and fauna of the natural world one requires
memetic constructs that correspond toevery hierarchical level wefind in
the biological world. The beginnings ofclassification isembarked upon
as is thetopicof complexity. Finally, thissection introduces the notion
ofknowledge representation in memeticphase space. Apreferred ordering
ispresented using word frequency ordering. One question explored here
iswhethereach individual constructs hisown phasespaceorhasaninternal
phase space which is different from the 'universal' phase space. The
universal phase space isessentially that of the collection ofallindividual
phase spaces, with 'universal frequencies' obtained from summarizing all
theindividual phase spaces.
VI. Memetic Spread Equations. Inthis section, the initial approaches
tomemetic spread equations are laid out in the form of probabilities of
interactions and thermodynamic weights. The complete construction of
spread equations naturally follows, and is left for subsequent papers.
II. Replicators, Vehicles and Memes - Reintroduction.
In TSG Dawkins first introduces the term "replicator" asabiological
molecule that has "the extraordinary propertyofbeing able to make copies
of itseir. Dawkins describes replicators in terms of several necessary
properties. In order to consider an entity a replicator, the entity must
possess attributes offecundity, fidelity and, longevity. Furthermore, tobe
considered an active replicator the replicator must have some influence
over it's probability ofbeing copied. Thus, a replicator isanything of
which copies are made. Examples of replicators canbe DNA and RNA
molecules, monomers and polymers, songs, sheets of paper that get
xeroxed, chain letters, 'junk'faxes, books, records, videotapes, behavior,
memes, ladies' fashions, patternson snake skins, etc. All these entities
can be characterized by theattribute that they spawn copiesorareexamples
ofentities that have been copied. In most cases, copying ofthese entities
isperformed with special care toreduce any errors that may be introduced
inthe copying process, and that the items copied exist for a duration that
can allow further copies (or generations) tobe made; i.e. they normally
donotcease toexistwhen a copyhasbeen made.
Replicators can be categorized in a variety of ways. Dawkins
suggested thecategories ofdead-end and germ-line replicators. Dead-end
replicators give rise toa finite number of copies and have only finite
number ofdescendant generations. Agerm-line replicator, isthe potential
ancestor ofanindefinite number ofcopies. It is the germ-line replicator
that isofconsiderable interest for us asthe item for further investigation.
Now, in complete analogy with the biological cases, we seek adescriptive
process that allows us totreat replicators ora collection ofreplicators as
being 'alive' or 'dead'. To refine this point, one can make use of a
formalism developed by Dyson23 to model the evolution oflife. Dyson
looksat a deceptively simplemodel where 'aliveness* is related to order,
and 'death' is related to disorder. What is of interest to Dyson is the
transition from disorder toorder (as the crux of the origin of life). What
emerges from Dyson's model is that death of a complex 'alive'entity is
statistically possible, whereas the 'resurrection* ofa 'dead'entity is not
possible. A further consequence of Dyson'smodel is that thenumber of
distinct basic building blocks that primary replicators (in his case species)
must be made of is greater than nine. What one can take from Dyson's
work is that a reasonable number (several thousand) of molecular units,
that areallowed mutations and mutual catalysis, can support transition
from disorder toorder (life generation) and active replication which can
be regarded as life.
A particularchallenge is to recast this disorder -> order transitionin
general terms, and apply it to memes and memetic constructs. One
approach is toconsider memes expressed as ideas which utilize language
(such asEnglish) and totrack the genesis, mutation, replication and spread
of ideas which use one or more 'modern' languages on which we can
performquantitative analysis.
Forcompleteness one has to address thequestion of thecontext and
embedding ofreplicators. Inother words, replicators may berather small,
fragile entities (e.g. genes, DNA segments, words). What then directly
assists replicators in their existence and struggle forsurvival in the arena
of natural selection? In TSG and TEP Dawkins suggests that there are
'vehicles' in which replicators 'travel about'. In particular, to quote
Dawkins," Avehicle isanentity inwhich replicators (genes and memes)
travel about, anentity whose attributes areaffected by replicators inside
it, an entity which may be seen as a compound tool of replicator
propagation." Aside from individual organisms thatcanact as vehicles,
Dawkins allows for" a hierarchy ofentities embedded inlarger entities",
any one of which may act as a vehicle.
While Dawkins concentrates onbiological organisms asvehicles, and
memes/replicators housed in biological organisms such as brains and
bodies, it is important for us to clearly understand that non-biological
entities such asbooks, computers, optical disks, etc. are just asimportant
(ifnot more so). The issues ofthe latterbeing phenotypical manifestations
and biologically produced is a matter left for epistemologists for future
discussion.
At this point wereturn to memes as theprincipal item of interest.
The concept of units of cultural transfer and inheritance has been
hypothesized by many individuals. As early as 1935, one can find a
reference to hereditary-like cultural entities in Zipf24. In discussing
properties of language, Zipfidentifies the 'acteme' as thesmallestunitof
experiential classification, and inparticular asa 'gene ofmeaning'. While
Zipfs interest lay mainly in analysis of language and relationship of
frequencies of word usage, their rank and their length, more recent
investigators use units of cultural transfer to study and explain modifi
cation ofbehavior. InWiener's seminal monograph onCybernetics25 one
finds references toideas and collection ofideas asan interacting system.
Bateson26ampli fies these in talking about ecologiesofideas and explicitly
states that "in the ecology of ideas there is anevolutionary process".
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There are many issues whenonestartsthediscussion ofevolution of
ideas and/or cultural evolution. There are always questions of biological
evolution independent of cultural evolution, cultural evolution indepen
dentof biological evolution, interdependent biological andcultural evo
lution and the questions of natural selection and fitness in a changing
environment. In the past two decades, a numberof relevant exploratory
books(in addition to TSG and TEP monographs of Dawkins) have been
published in the area of cultural evolution which treat these types of
questions. The primary monographs by Bonner27, Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman", Lumsden and Wilson0, and Boyd and Richerson28serve asa
good foundation, andprovide useful references foradditional research into
thistopic from thebiological evolutionary perspectivewhile Hull provides
a modem philosophical perspective29.
In the introduction, a preliminary definition of memes was givenas
units of cultural transmissionor imitation. This is the original definition
given byDawkins inTSG. InTEP Dawkins revised thedefinition ofmeme
to be "a unit of information residing in a brain", with a subsidiary
clarification that words, music, gestures etc. are to be regarded as
phenotypic effects of memes which are perceived by sense organs and
lead to 'meme imprinting' in otherbrains.At thispointone mustrealize
that Dawkins has provided two different definitions for memes. In fact
Dawkinshas tieddown memesto dependencieson biologicalentities,and
in particular he reiterates Bonner's statement that "Memes are utterly
dependent on genes, butgenescan exist andchange quite independently
of memes".This last statement must be treated with great caution. Later,
inthispaper, itwill beevident thatwhilebiological entitiesoriginally gave
rise to early memes, this is no longer the case. It is important now to
appreciate themagnitude of Dawkins' contributions tothearticulation and
foundation of study of memes but at the same time also realizethat his
contributionsformthe starting pointand leavesignificantand interesting
work to be done.
III.l Roots: Philosophical Beginnings.
Thereare manyindividuals throughout recorded historythat specu
lated about the nature of thought and knowledge.Highlights of the most
prominent Western philosophical thinking in this area are discussed by
Bertrand Russell30. We can find the rootsof memeticsciencedistributed,
albeit unevenly, throughout history. The main recognizable periods are
those of the early Greeks, the Interregnum between Plato and the
Renaissance, theRenaissance, Darwinand postDarwin, theearly modem
era, and present modem era during which the concepts of Dawkins,
Bonner, Cavalli-Sforza, Lumsden and Wilson,Boydand Richerson, and
Hull started taking shape.
The recognizable contributors of the Early Greek Period include
Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and Plato. Parmenides, father of logical
metaphysics, identified thoughts withtheobjectof thoughts, andheldthat
if words are used in some meaningful way, what the word means must
somehowexist (objectively).His approachimplicitlyassumesconstancy
of meaning of wordsand is known to lead to logical difficulties. Another
early principal philosopher isAnaxagoras whointroduced philosophy to
Athens as well as the concept that 'mind' was the principal cause of
physical change.
The earliest generally developed and most influential theory of
knowledge is that of Plato originally presented in "Theaetetus" and
subsequently in"The Republic"31. Plato advances the theory offorms or
ideas [we'llcall them P-ideas]. P-ideas were argued tobethose ideas with
which individuals are endowed at the time of birth. P-ideas are abstract
constructs that exist in the absence of individuals, they were regardedas
objective truths. Any object could then be described as possessing
properties or qualities of one or more of these P-ideas or forms. For
example a blank sheet of white paper would be described as possessing
the form of rectangleness, whiteness, and blankness. Geometric propo
sitions wereregarded asP-ideas thatexisted as trueabstract entities even
in the absence ofa thinker. Associated with P-ideas are four states ofmind:
imagining, belief, thinking, and intelligence. P-ideas operate or exist in
the 'intelligence' state of mind.
Representations of physical andabstract entities in terms of P-ideas,
andvariationsofP-ideas, dominated asignificant fraction ofphilosophical
thinking [much of which was concerned with issues of truth, supreme
creator, morals and ethics]. Russell expressed the critical question asso
ciatedwithP-ideas, andultimatelyontology, asfollows," Thereal question
is: Is thereanything we can thinkof which, by the merefact thatwe can
think of it, is shown to exist outside our thought?".
During theInterregnum between Plato andtheRenaissance onefinds
a small group attheUniversity ofParis, called theAverroists, whoduring
themid Thirteenth Century held thebelief that immortality isassociated
with theintellect, and thatintellectis an impersonal entitywhichcanexist
in identical forms in different intellectual beings. This is probably the
earliest conception of unlabeled memes (where theconcept of meme can
be substituted for the concept of intellect). Another major contribution
comesfrom William of Occam (originator of Occam'sRazorprinciple)
whoelaboratedonwordsandconcepts, defining 'concepts'asnatural signs
and 'words' as conventional signs. Oneof Occam'scontributions is his
insistence that it is always possible to study logic andhuman knowledge
without resorting to metaphysics or theology. Bymaintaining thisinsis
tence,Occamcontributed totheemergenceof thescientificmethod. Later,
NicoloMachiavelli's thesisthat "poweris for thosewho havetheskill to
seizeit in a free competition" contributed to the thestream of thought
leading to thetheory of natural selection.
The Renaissance and post Renaissance periodsyielded a vital con
tinuation of early Greek thinking. During this period the importance of
thought andP-ideas continued toevolve. Descartes' cogito ergosum and
hisCartesian geometry set thestageformuch ofcontemporary theoretical
science. In declaring 'cogito', as the prime irreducible, he elevated the
importance of the concepts of 'thought' and 'thinking' to the premier
indisputable aspect of perception from which everything elsefollows, or
with which every sensible perception must be explained. Of course,
Descartes recognized thatallsuchthoughtsareprivate thoughts, perceived
by the individual thinking them without the possibility of determining
what another individual is able to know or comprehend about them.
Cartesianthoughts of this naturewill be denotedby C-ideas.
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Descartes paved the way for John Locke and David Hume. Locke
originated the strict empiricist approach based on the notion that all
knowledge is derived from experience (except perhaps for mathematics
andlogic). Locke asserted thatthere arenoinnate ideas, andthatall ideas
derive from either sensation orperception of the operation ofourmind.
Amajor philosophical insight ofLocke isthat all things that we perceive
are 'particular' instances of those things, but that we have the ability to
frame ideas about 'universals' (recall here that Plato and Aristotle had
severe problems intheir treatments ofparticulars and universals).
Among some of theother insights of Locke is that wecannot fully
know physical things, wecanonlyknow word-definitions of them. This
is important to memetics in that words and word-constructs are the
principal entities we can deal with ina robust way. Additionally, Locke
pointed out that many ofthe distinctions we claimbetween objects are not
facts of nature but facts of language. With respect to 'ideas' thethemes
that mind has no immediate objects but its own ideas, and that knowledge
is the perception ofagreement ordisagreement of two ideas, arethemes
that underly Locke's philosophy.
Locke's work form the foundation for Hume's. Hume's approach to
the notion ofideas can besummarized asfollows: a)impressions are the
immediate sensations we are aware ofdue to external stimuli, b)ideas are
faint images ofimpressions [we'll tag these H-ideas], c)we cannot know
anything we have not had aprior impression of, and d) there are complex
impressions which lead to complex ideas made up ofsimple ideas.
With this foundation, Hume asserted three fundamental 'laws of
ideas'.
1. Ideas are connected by resemblance ofideas; for example, a
picture of Einstein makes us think about Einstein.
2.Ideas are connected bycontiguity inspace and time. Ifwethink
ofone room ina house, wearevery likely to think about rooms
adjoiningit.
3. Our mind is impelled to seek/postulate cause & effect rela
tionships between ideas. When we are exposed totwo events, A
and B, that are contiguous in space and/or time, we tend to
postulate a cause &effect relationship between Aand B.Thisis
particularly true if we observe the conjunction of A & B
repeatedly. Philosophically, Hume argues that while wecannot
know[perhaps,ever] that aparticularcause must haveaparticular
effect, we will still tend to associate the ideas of A and B and
searchfor a necessary connection.
Hume has also given us the notions ofanalytic propositions (propo
sitionsabout logic) and syntheticpropositions (about mattersoffact), with
the assertion that the only knowable propositions are the analytic
propositions. These classes of propositions and their relationship to
memetic constructs are areas ofpotential interest tothe philosophers.
The nextmajorstepbeforeDarwinis thatof Kant. Immanuel Kantis
considered by many as theforemost thinker of hisperiod andoneof the
principal philosophersofalltimes. Hismost importantwork, "TheCritique
of Pure Reason", develops the argument that while none of human
knowledge can transcend experience, some of this knowledge is not
necessarily obtained inductively from experience. Kant calls this non-
inductively obtained knowledge a-priori knowledge. Thus there are
multiple categorizations of knowledge. There aresynthetic and analytic
propositions as well as empirical anda-priori propositions (thelines of
division being different). Technically, according toRussell, ananalytic
proposition is one in which the predicate is part of thesubject, while a
syntheticproposition isaproposition that isnotanalytic. Finally, empirical
propositions arebased onsensory perception. Kant's "Critique" works at
answering the question offeasibility ofa-priori synthetic propositions.
The Kantian synthesis is this:
* outerworld(W) causesinner(I) sensation.
* inner mental tools order I-sensation inspace andtime.
* innermental toolssupply concepts withwhich we understand
experience (collection of I sensations).
* things in themselves (W-things) are unknowable.
*inner mental tools include 12 'categories' ora-priori concepts:
- unity, plurality, totality
- reality, negation, limitation
- substance &accident, cause & effect, reciprocity
- possibility, existence, necessity.
* space and time are subjective concepts that apply to all
I-sensations.
* W-things are not in spaceand time.
* fallacies in logic arise when one tries toapply space and time
discussion to a-priori concepts.
Kant utilized his system toargue that there are 'ideas ofpure reason'
(such asGod, Freedom and Immortality) and that while pure reason leads
us toform ideas such as these, pure reason cannot prove their existence.
In memetic parlance, this is equivalent tosaying that we can originate
memes using our mental tools, but we cannot prove their truth or the
existence of meme predicates.
The Kantian synthesis, while somewhat aged, isone tokeep inmind
as we later examine Edelman's theory ofconsciousness32. Additionally,
while we got the notions ofa-priori, a-posteriori, and synthetic knowledge
from Kant, Kant's "CritiqueofPure Reason" was asourceofgreat concern
tomany. Tothisday, many oftheissues raised byKant remain unanswered
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in a satisfactory manner leading some of this century's prominent
physicists, such asSirJ.Jeans", toavoid the issue ofexistence ofa-priori
knowledge.
As the Kantian roots of memetics were being completed, the most
significant biological roots wereemerging withtheappearance ofCharles
Darwin's "Origin of the Species"34. Darwin's contributions are now
regarded as thecenter piece of biological sciences namely the theory of
evolution based on natural selection operating on results of random
mutations. While there is still discussion as to what random mutation
means and at what level (gene, organism, group,...) natural selection
operates, all biologists and most scientists accept the evolutionary
approach asoperationally true. Thisbiological evolutionary theory forms
the backbone of the various socio-biological theories and is a natural
componentof memeticscience.
III.2 Roots. Cultural Evolution, Sociobiology,...
Thelastsectionaddressed thegeneral foundations thatformthebasis
forthelanguage andconcepts that allowed discussions of memes. In this
section the more modem and direct foundations of memetic science are
addressed. Thereare two typesof modemfoundations: thosethat lay the
technical (quantitative basis) and those that explicitly refer to cultural
entities as replicating and spreading entities. Without question, the two
individuals who have originated the primary socio-cultural and socio-
biological framework which contributed most significantly to memetic
science, though not under the label memetic science, areE.O. Wilson of
Harvard University and R. Dawkins of Oxford University. As has
happened in the history of science before, Wilson's and Dawkins' ideas
matured at about thesametime andbothmen published significant books
inclose temporal proximity. Wilson's "Sociobiology"35appeared in 1975,
while Dawkin's "The Selfish Gene"2 appeared in1976. This isreminiscent
of the Darwin / Wallace intellectual priority questions. Over the next
decade both individuals continued to contribute significantly to the
clarification of their concepts. Dawkins followed upwith a more technical
(but regrettably non-quantitative)book "The Extended Phenotype"3which
appeared in1982, while Wilson and hiscollaborator, Lumsden, came out
with a detailed rigorous quantitative theory ofgene-culture interaction in
the book "Genes, Mind, Culture"4 in 1981 followed by a qualitative
descriptive book "Promethean Fire"5 in 1983.
Thequantitative tools required for memetics draw from two com-
munities.The bio-mathematical roots tracetoVolterra" and Lotka10. Lotka
wrote a very readable book, "Elements of Mathematical Biology"10, in
1924. Although most of the book deals with a unified mathematical
description ofbiology, (starting with astatistical basis, and delving into
questions of the kinetics ofevolving systems, biochemical basis, inter
species rivalries and equilibrium processes, and discussions of con
sciousness), Lotka isaware of thesignificance ofcultural interactions. In
fact he has a 'pseudo-memetic' outlook as can be gleaned from the
following paragraph in hisbook,
"In the human species the communication of information
from onetoanother takes place chiefly through speech, tradition
and carved, written or printed records. In a recent number of
Nature there appeared Professor Bohr'saddress onthestructure
of theatom,deliveredon theoccasionof theawardto him of the
Nobel prizefor1922. Inthishistorical survey ofthedevelopment
ofhistheory hementions nearly fifty names ofinvestigatorswho
directly orindirectlycontributed tothispartofour-world picture.
A person intelligently reading this lecture, making the picture
part of hisown mental stock-in-trade, is thus virtually endowed
with fifty pairs of eyesandhands, and has the benefit of fifty
brains, for the most part brains of the first rank Faraday,
Maxwell, ..., Lorentz,Plank,Einstein, to mentiononlya few.It
is this thought-transmitting propensity of the human species,
more than any other, that gives it a superlative lead overall the
othercreatures of theglobe Evolution in thiscase proceeds
not merely by theslow process of selection, but is immensely
hastened bythe cumulative and continuous growth ofa body of
knowledge exempt from thoselawsofmortality which seta term
to the life of an individual Our Galileos, our Newtons, our
Thomsons, have not been singled out by a process of lethal
selection from others less fit to survive. The process by which
viable, pragmatically competent systems of thought (orworld-
description) areevolved is quite other than this....The decisive
factor was the simplicity .... eased further advance of
knowledge."
The bio-statistical tools for memetics are the same as those of
population genetics, namely the classical worksofFisher36, Wright3, and
Haldane38. Thesetools, articulated in theearly1930's,havein factformed
the basis of much of contemporary human population genetics (an
excellent, readable reference onthistopicisCavalli-Sforza andBodmer's
book "The Genetics ofHuman Populations"l4 which contains sufficient
yet not stifling quantitative discussions). Atabout the same time (1935),
Zipf published a thorough investigation ofcertain statistical aspects of
language in abook titled "The Psycho-Biology of Language"24 (hence to
be designated PBL). PBL is a rather remarkable product that has been
largely ignored, we will use many ofthe empirical findings recorded there
for the initial construction of word-oriented memetic theories.
During the late 1940's we see a number ofareas emerging. Hebb
developedatheory ofadaptive reinforcement39which has found much use
in modeling artificial neural systems. Wiener articulated thebasics of
control and communications system theory in his book "Cybernetics"25,
published in 1948, and Shannon and Weaver40 laid the definitive foun
dation of Information Theory in 1948. It is interesting to note here that
Wiener also recognized the contribution of the British empiricists Locke
and Hume. Wiener addresses the theory that mind is made of entities
known as 'ideas' and that ideas unite themselves into 'bundles'. Wiener
recalls thecontiguity principleofHume which allowsoneH-idea totrigger
its associated idea bundle. Wiener also discusses Pavlov's experiments
with dogsand theexperimental confirmationofunionbycontiguity,which
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inthecaseofdogs isevident intheirpatternofbehavior. Wienerrecognizes
theinterest of researchersofpsychologyandsociology incybernetics, but
explicitly states hisview that these communities lackadequate conceptual
frameworks, and in particular, they lack tools equivalent to those of
dynamics theory in physics. Zipfappears again at thistime (1949) with
hislittle understood "Human Behavior andthePrinciple ofLeast Effort"41
inwhich thephysics' principle of leastaction isdiscussed. Onecanderive
from theprinciple of least action much of theneeded dynamics. Unfor
tunately, thefield ofpsychologywasnotready inthe1940'sforaninjection
of theoretical physics. Zipfs expertise and background in philology did
little to endear him or his theories to either psychologists, sociologists,
biologists or physicists with significant lossof opportunities.
Before passing to a detailed discussion of the direct technical
foundations of memetics, it is worth mentioning the perspective of Sir
James Jeans, a prominent physicist and astronomer. Jeans' views are
representative ofphysicists of theGolden Age of Physics during which a
new world view emerged, namely the theory of relativity andquantum
mechanics. Jeans discussed the conceptual evolution ofphysics inhisvery
readable book "Physics and Philosophy"33. Many physicists, who one
would normally think ofasdealing with inanimate objects ofnature (such
asatoms, electrons, starsand galaxies), found themselves concerned with
the interaction of observer and observed entities.
Concerning the importance ofthe entities wecall ideas Jeans says:
"What were mere associations of ideas in the brains of
animals readily became translated into natural laws in the mind
ofthinking men Butnowthecomplication intervenes that our
minds do not take kindly to knowledge expressed in abstract
mathematical form. Our mental faculties have come to us,
through a long line of ancestry, from fishes and apes. At each
stage the primaryconcernof our ancestorswas not to understand
theultimate processes of physics, buttosurvive in the struggle
for existence, to kill other animals without themselves being
killed. They did not do this by pondering over mathematical
formulae, butbyadapting themselves tothehard facts of nature
andtheconcrete problems ofeveryday life. Those whocould not
do thisdisappeared, while thosewho couldsurvived, and have
transmitted minds to us which are more suited to deal with
concrete facts than with abstract concepts, with particulars rather
than universals; minds that are more at home in thinking of
material objects, rest and motion, pushes, pulls and impacts, than
in tryingto digestsymbols and formulae."
However, all this is totrick us. The fact that ourbrains areorganized
todeal with concrete facts does not force nature to actually be made up
ofsimple entities digestible toourbrains. The physicists of the Golden
Agediscovered, to theirchagrin, that forcessuchas Newtonian forces do
not have real objective existence, they are instead "mental constructs
which we make for ourselves inaneffort tounderstand the workings of
nature". Quantum mechanics led to the realization that one cannot describe
physical processes in terms of theusual concepts of time and space. The
trend of our understanding of nature is consistent with Einstein's view
that,asJeansstatesit, "asexperimentalresearchadvances,the fundamental
lawsof nature become simplified more andmore, and, as in many other
departments of physics, we find this simplicity residing neither in the
physical facts, nor in theirexplicit pictorial representation, but solely in
the mathematical formulae that describe the pattern of events."
There are other notable discussions in Jeans' bookconcerning the
different interpretations ofspace andtime. Thediscussion ofconceptual
spaceand time is particularly interesting becauseit showsthat the notion
of memes is immanent. Jeans provides the following description of
conceptual space,
"Conceptual space is primarily the space of abstract
geometry. It has no existenceof any kindexcept in the mindof
the man whois creating it by thinking of it, andhe maymake it
Euclidean or non-Euclidean, three-dimensional or multidimen
sional as he pleases. It goes out of existence when the creator
stops thinking about it- unlessof course he perpetuates it in a
text-book."
Jeansisofcourse incomplete inthat heignores the fact that conceptual
spacecan exist in somerespects in memory and can be recalled by the
original thinker of theparticular conceptual space. However, weseesome
of the basic features of memes inbisdescription. For Jeans, conceptual
space can exist in twoways,one in the mindof a thinker,and theother in
a textbook. Already, by theactof transcribing a thought, one iscreating
a representational replica oftheconceptual-space-thought inthetextbook.
Next, when onereads thetextbook, onecreates another representational
replica of the conceptual space in the readers' neural system (i.e. the
reader's brain). Obviously there is no way to ascertain that the original
conceptual-space thought is replicated identicallyinthebrain of thereader,
however, the fact that we all can conceive of some things, write
instructions down forcreating them, and then have others produce that
which wehave described, indicates that certain degree of replication of
thought is possible. Again precise discussions require an elaborate
mathematical representation; thiswillbe provided later.
Wenow come to thecontemporary foundations of memetics. There
have been a number of individuals who have contributed directly or
indirectly. While the theories of Dawkins and Wilson and Lumsden
deserve special attention, there are a number of other individuals that have
contributed. All those individuals who have concerned themselves with
cultural transmission have contributed in a broad sense. Cavalli-Sforza
and Bodmer42, havediscussed culturalevolution and itseffecton natural
selection as earlyas 1971. They recognize the important fact thatrate of
cultural evolution ismuch faster than biological evolution. They charac
terizecultural evolution in termsof invention and infective transmission,
and state their perception that "the interactions between cultural and
geneticevolution have notbeeninvestigated inanydepth". It isclearfrom
theirdiscussion thatitwould bea longtimebefore a scienceof memetics
would be ready to emerge. (My informal observation here is that while
the kernel of cultural evolution was articulated, and the bio-mathematical
tools readily available, the focus was on relating cultural entities to
genetics. While this aim is admirable, it is a severe constraint due to the
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fact that no useful planned experiments can take place over a human
lifetime. The only type of discussion that can take place is analysis of
historical data toopoorlydocumentedto yieldmorethanbroadqualitative
statements.)
Clearly, the major text to present a coherent, well formulated
theoretical and semi-empirical basis for cultural evolution is Wilson's
"Sociobiology"24. There have been many discussions of thispivotal text,
withall kindsofaxes togrind by differentcamps.Again,what is important
to stress here is that memetic science, at this point, should not strive to
generatea broaddiscussion ofbiological orsodobiologicalprinciplesand
goals.Memetics shouldaim to explainthe mechanism by whichcultural
entities, and in particular language and word based replicators replicate!
Thus as one discusses "Sociobiology", one must note its excellent and
logical presentation of thebasic mechanisms of population biology,group
selection,time-energybudgets,communication,andofcourse,discussion
of particular social species.However, this treatise still does not address
culturalreplicatorsas replicatorsand objects requiringspecificstudy.
The stage is set, however, for Dawkins. In 1976 Dawkins' TSG
appears. Dawkins, in TSG mentionsSir Karl Popper's analogy between
scientific progress and genetic evolution 43. Dawkins also refers to L. L.
Cavalli-Sforza42, F.T. Cloak44, and J. M. Cullen45, in hisdiscussions of
memes,and toE.O.Wilson's tome, "Sociobiology", as a general reference.
As mentioned earlier Lumsden and Wilson introduced their concept
of 'culturgen' shortly after Dawkins articulated the concept of memes.
The culturgen concept makes its first appearance in the July 1980 issue
ofthe Proceedings ofthe National Academy ofScience (USA) *6. L&W
loosely defineculturgen as an array of behaviors and artifacts that are
transmitted by a cultural speciesduringthe process of socialization. The
roots of the word culturgen, from Latin, are cultur (culture) + gen
(produce). Cultergens aresubsequently used fortheintegrated discussion
of genetic and cultural transfer. Theculturgen theory is developed and
refined inseveral articles4*50and two books *A. Ultimately, L&W suggest
that culturgens can be equated to the "node ofsemantic memory"50 (this
is in factan evolution of theoriginal culturgen, and moreclosely related
to the concept of memes as they are utilized here than the original
culturgen). Lumsden and Wilson provide references to a number of
cultural constructs in their books and papers. The reader is referred to
GMC4for these references.
Closely related tothetheories ofLumsden andWilson andDawkins,
are the quantitative formulations of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, best
represented in their book "Cultural Transmission and Evolution"15 which
appeared in 1981. CS&F areaware of Dawkins' memes; however, they
argue thatitishard toobserve discreteunitsofimitationordiscrete changes
in cultural traits. As the title of their book indicates, they focus on the
mathematical theory of transmission of cultural traits. To their added
credit, theyrecognize theimportance andutility ofstudying theevolution
of language. In their words,
"Our first topic is the evolutionof language, an issue less
fraught with emotional overtones than say, social interactions
and inequality, or altruism. Language also has the advantage of
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reliable, accurate measurement not only because of the nature
of theculturalobject understudybut alsobecauseof the tradition
of rigor thathascharacterized thisdiscipline".
The availability anddesirability of language as a domain of testing
of memeticscience is thus implicitlyrecognized.
While Dawkins, Lumsden and Wilson, and Cavalli-Sforza focused
on cultural transmission in general with distinctapplication to humans,
John Bonner of Princeton University investigated culture in animals.
Interestingly enough, Bonner'sbookwas also published in thisexciting
period (1980). Bonner's very readable text, "The Evolution ofCulture in
Animals"27, generalizes discussion of culture; with culture in animals
being theprincipal subject matter. Inthisbook Bonner takesupdiscussion
of Dawkins' memes, and makes use of the word meroeas "any bit or any
collectionof bits of information passedby behavioral means from one
individual toanother". Bonner clearly doesnotfavor attempts at lumping
genetic andcultural selection (as Lumsden andWilson have done).
Bonnerstressesthreemajordifferences betweengeneticandcultural
evolution. To Bonner, modesof information transfer, ratesof evolutionary
change, andasymmetric dependencies ofgenes andmemes oneach other
are critical differences. Wewill amplify someof hisobservations laterin
this paper.
A lateryetstill major contribution tothefield ofcultural evolution is
the monograph by Boyd and Richerson "Culture and the Evolutionary
Process"28. Boyd and Richerson restrict their attention to structures of
cultural transmission in humans. In a manner reminiscent ofLumsden and
Wilson, they linkmodels of cultural transmission to models of genetic
evolution to yield what they call "duel inheritance theory". While their
model makes useof themathematical machinery of population genetics,
their stated goal is "not tomake quantitative predictions" but to" clarify
thelogical relationships between cultural transmission and other Darwi
nian processes.... that may eventuallyallow ustomake general statements
abouttheevolution ofhuman behavior". BoydandRicherson makeapoint
of definingcultureas follows,
"Culture is information capable of affecting individuals'
phenotypes which they acquire from other conspecifics by
teaching or imitation"
Heretoowesee the importance of theconcept of imitation, however
B&R shyaway from specificsof thenature of the'information' they refer
to. They adopt much oftheformalism and nomenclature ofCavalli-Sforza
and Feldman15 aswell asgeneral reluctance todiscuss culture interms of
particulate units such as memes or culturgens. B&R alsoexpress reser
vations about the cultergenic "thousand year rule" and call for exper
imental studies of a "laws" of cultural transmission.
Finally, intherealm ofmathematical biology, oneneeds tomention
Brooks' and Wiley's casting of evolutionary biology in terms of ther
modynamic andentropic consideration. Brooks andWiley present their
efforts toward a unified evolutionary biology theory in "Evolution as
Entropy"51 where they detail calculation ofinformation theoretic entropy
10
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for a number of examples of evolutionary process models. B&W's work
is representative of a newbreedof evolution theoristswhoare searching
for an entropybased unified theoryof evolution.
While the sociobiologists and ecologists were busy developing
alternativemathematical andlogical formulations ofevolutionary biology,
a philosopher of biological systematicsand taxonomy was articulating a
model for the development of science. David Hull, of Northwestern
University, used his extensivebackground in philosophy, biology, and
history of biology to detail a model for describing what he calls "an
evolutionary account of the social and conceptual development of sci
ence". Hull's model and extensive theory is presented in a detailed,
excellently researched book"Science as a Process" 29. In thisbook, Hull
reflects on Dawkins' memes, Lumsden and Wilson's culturgens, Boyd
and Richerson's and Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's theories, and a host of
otherrelateddiscussions. Hullprovides a wealthof discussion of episodes
inscience whereonecanobserve cooperation, competition, mutation and
selection. Hull accepts Dawkins' memes and replicators as appropriate
concepts but rejectsDawkins' vehicles; relative to Boyd and Richerson
hestates"Onmyview,conceptual entitiesarereplicators, nottraits".What
one is leftwith uponreading thisbook is thatsomeof thebasicconcepts
fora science of concepts arehere,andto quote Hull again, "The fantasies
of Oz must be made as familiaras Kansas. There really is no place like
home".
Withthesephilosophical andtheoretical rootsinplacewecanproceed
to thedetaileddevelopmentof a rigorousframeworkfora scienceof ideas.
IV. Population Dynamics and Replicator Equations.
The thrustof thissection is to introduce somequantitative toolswith
which todiscuss theamount of replication that takes place inpopulations
thatcontain objects thatgetreplicated. Since thecommunity thatisbeing
introduced to thememe concept is made up of individuals with varying
mathematical backgrounds, thediscussions henceforth will omitrigorous
mathematical proofsin favorof outlining critical points.
Someof the original investigations dealing with replicating objects
were concerned with describing population growth. In this case, the
replicating objectsare biological organisms, and the itemsof interestare
describing historical population data and predicting future populations
(particularly human). The simplest situation to describe is that of unin
hibited growth of a singlespeciespopulation. If we denote by N = N(t)
the numberof individuals of the single species population at time t, the
equation describing the rateof changeof N is
dN
dt
~AN
(1)
with A being a constant. This equation models a rate processwhere the
rate of increaseof a populationis directlyproportional to the population.
The solution of equation (1), as expected, is an exponential one with N(t)
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= N0 exp(At), N0 being the initial population.A more realistic model is
one where there are some inhibiting factors. The simplest rate equation
that can be used to describe a populationwith an upper limit is
dN 2
-T-AN-BN2
dt
with A, B constant. An alternate form of this equation is
dN ( N\
with Ak = B. The solution of equation (2b) takes the form
N 1+Cexp(-At)
(2a)
(2b)
(3)
with C being a constant of integration. When plotted, this solution yields
an S shaped curve knownas the logisticcurve. The singlespecies model
with finite resources was used byPearl and Reed52 tomodel the population
of the UnitedStatesfrom 1790-1910.Pearland Reedobtainedaverygood
fit to the then observed population data (see Lotka, reference 10). Their
model resulted in the expression
Mi
197,273,000 (4)
l+exp(-0.0313395/')
with t' being the time in years from the referencedate of April 1,1914.
The graph correspondingto this logisticcurve is depicted in Figure1.
PEARL-REED MODEL OF U. S. POPULATION
1706 17S8
Figure 1: Example of a Logistic Curve.
The single species bounded growth model is formally identical to
models that are used to describe the spread of infectious diseases (in an
epidemic) and todiffusion of innovations15.
u
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The next step in developing models of replicators is to consider
interacting replicators. The simplest multi-species environment is
obviouslythe two species predator-preyidealizedecology. If one denotes
the populationof species-1andspecies-2by N, and Nj, thesimplestmodel
is a linear first order model
dNt
-£-aNx-bN2
dN2
-^^cNt-dN2
(5a)
(5b)
wherea, b, c, and d are positiveconstants.The pathologiesof this system
of equations have been discussed by Davis53. Davis shows that if one
defines A-k-a2 then thesolution of this system isexpressed by:
M =A cos(VA/ +p) (6a)
N2=Bcos{VKt+q) (6b)
where A, B, q, and p are determined by initial conditions (there are
consistency relationships that relate parameters and populations; these are
not discussed here). A quick observation here is that Nt and N2 have a
sinusoidalor harmonic functional form and there is an obvious phase lag
relative to each other. Additionally, one can explore the relationshipsof
N, and N2 in a phase plane representation,this typeof analysis is presently
popular especially for nonlinear chaotic systems.
A more realistic generalization is the one studied by Volterra and
Lotka. Their approach models the populations of one species that preys
on a second species. The population of the prey species is Nj while the
predator population is given by N2. Qualitatively what happens is when
the prey population, Nt, is large, the predator species has 'easy food' and
its population N2 grows.As N2 increases,N, decreasesresultingin a tight
foodsupplyandstarvationfor thepredators.The reductionin N2 thenleads
to increases in Nt and repetition of the entire cycle. This Volterra-Lotka
processis described by the coupled nonlinear equations:
dN,
-jj-aN^-bN^
dN2
(7a)
(7b)
Adetailed mathematical discussion ofthis system isgiven inDavis59
and will not be repeated here save to say that there exists a phase
relationshipbetween predator and prey populations(as in the linearcase),
while the oscillations in population are not harmonic. The existence of a
stablearrangementbetween the two populationsiscriticallydependenton
initial conditions, and can easily result in a catastrophe for a balanced
system.
One can easily generalize to a larger number of interacting species
with morecomplicated interactions. Schusterand Sigmund16use theform:
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dN; I <J>\
^-*(Wi tfJ-J) (8)
to describe generic replicator equations. By definition, in their system,
M + •••+M =c is a positive definite invariant and2MF; =$ is a fitness
functional.
While it is possibleto exploredifferentordersof replicatorequations,
it appears that equations of order 3 or 4 are sufficient to capture most of
the dynamical aspects of simply-interactingspecies. An example of a
homogeneous replicator equation of order 4 is:
^-^2«WWi*»--J (9)
where summation extends over the indices j, k, 1,and m. Note that lower
order equationsmay be recovered by a suitablechoiceof the coefficient
matrix and initial conditions. A critical shortcoming of these type of
replicatorequations is their inability to deal with mutatingand emerging
species as newly appearingspecies. Another shortcomingis the absence
of explicitdiscussion of spatial relationships (for memetics'distance' is
not necessarily limitedto geographical distancebut can includea gener
alized distancein an appropriate phasespace). It is howeverpossible to
conceive of the replicator equations as summarizing the 'population
statistics' of competing traitsin culturaltransferor of competing memes.
Ifone carefully examinesquantitative works exemplified by CS&F15,
L&W4' andB&R28 [summarized indetail byB&R] onewould notice the
prevalence of replicator type equations (especially in discussions of
diffusionof innovations).Another recurrentfeatureis theanalysisin terms
of cultural transmission along vertical, horizontal,and oblique channels
with associatedbiasingdescribedin termsof probabilitiesof occurrence.
A generalized Fokker-Plank equation is also implicitly or explicitly
presented for calculating evolving probability densities in terms of
individual meme frequencies4'1*28.
A prevalent featureof most quantitative theoriesof culturaltransfer
is the reliance on the extensive mathematical machinery developed in
theoretical genetics to treat biparental transmission with cultural allele
'inheritance'. The models typically work with a dominant/recessive
representation and eventually progress to multiple state representation
based on rigorous but a-priori probabilistic formulation. While these
canonical approachesare suitable for addressing the standard questions
of genetic analysis and ethnographic descriptions, they do not lend
themselvestodirect extensionsfor answeringthe core questionsthat face
memetics, and ultimately the micro-theory of cultural evolution. In
particular, as expressedby B&R, these theories ignore the detailed nature
of the informationthat is passed,and the way that detailed natureaffects
the phenotype. This state of affairs has led B&R to remark that "our
understanding of the neurophysiology of social learningis at a primitive
state". Finally, to summarize the state of affairs regarding quantitative
theories of cultural evolution it is useful to quote B&R, who in their
concluding observations about the fieldstate [ref.28, p 299]
12
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"Wehave takenas our task the constructionof simplemodelsfor
as many of the basic mechanisms of cultural evolution as we
could find suitable detailed suggestions for and for which we
could make a plausible empirical case. ... Like a sixteenth-
century map of the world, the scale is small, distortions
undoubtedly exist, some of the processes includedare likely to
prove apocryphal, and large areas are blank.... much hard work
remains to be done."
V. Language Based Memes.
The development of a generalized quantitative theory of cultural
evolution is probably one of the more ambitious pursuits of modem
science. In the remainder of thepaper wewill address only a part of this
goal,namely thedevelopment of a rigorous science of ideas. Thisscience
ofideas hasasitsultimate goal theelucidation ofthemicro-dynamics that
govern theinitiation, combination, mutation, spread anddeath of ideas.
Tothis end, direct discussion of theinteraction ofphenotypic expressions
with genotype manifestations is omitted. Rather, a fuller discussion of
some particular language based and information/knowledge based
mechanisms is pursued.
A useful basis and context for language based memes is that of
knowledge representation. Moritz54 argues that Homo sapiens' premier
role in nature isdueto theextremely highly developed human abilities of
information manipulation, knowledge extraction, and knowledge appli
cation. Since the invention of language, continuing through the intro
duction of writing and record keeping, and culminating in the
unprecedented pace of development of computer software andhardware
of thepast five decades, progressively more powerful tools have been
developedthat aidand amplify human cognitive abilities. The kernel of
cognitive abilities and cognitive function amplifiers iscomposed ofthree
principal components: 1)knowledge, 2) physical structure, and 3)[inter
and intra system] communication channels and protocols.
Withrespecttocommunication channels, transmission of cultureand
spread of scientific researchare two activities that could notexist without
the tools language provides. Infact, language acts asthe principal element
inall vectors (e.g. speeches, books, journals, TV, radio) that spread culture
and ideas.
A key todevelopment ofthetheory isthe realization that language is
a particular manifestation ofa communication strategy. Furthermore, the
communication strategy isgoverned by thermodynamical physical prin
ciples, where the relevant thermodynamic representations are best
expressed interms of information theoretic and complexity measures.
Processes that involve ideas or memes are dynamic processes of
information and knowledge manipulation. Any process of this nature is
referred toasa Knowledge Information Process or KIP. Examples of
KIPs in machinebased systems include:communications of ASCII files
via modems, representation of information in a semantic net, query
processes in a relational database, merging of two dissimilar databases,
extraction of rules from data for expert system construction, application
ofknowledge-based system heuristic rules, training ofanartificial neural
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networkclassifier,extractionof a featurevector fromrawdata,generation
of logical inferences or hypotheses in knowledge based systems, and, in
general, execution of any data processing algorithm.
KIPs have been present in biological systems much earlier than in
machines. KIPs in [mammalian] biological systems are processes that
engage the brain and/or the central nervous system (CNS). Examplesof
[human] neuro-biological KIPs include: seeing and enjoyinga painting,
giving a lecture on a technical subject, performing a mathematical
calculation, writing a letter to a friend, and numerous other high level
cognitive activities. Other neuro-biological KIPs involve non [directly]
observable low level processes such as biological memory formation,
synaptic transmission, flowof information from thecortex to theamyg
dala, and inter- and intra- neuronal processes.
With the definition of a KIP Agent as any biological or machine
Knowledge/Information Processing entity (e.g., child, adult -human,
computer, fax - machine), it is possible to explore knowledge formation,
knowledge representation and knowledge spread as activitiesthatoccur
withinand between KIPAgents. UseofthenotionsofKIPsandKIPAgents
will allow application of memetics to knowledge/information processes
in both biological and machine systems.
In this context werecall that there area number ofdistinctly different
categories of memes. In particular one can distinguish: 1) linguistic
memes, 2)visual memes, 3)musical memes, and4)procedural/behavioral
memes. These categoriesarenotorthogonal; infact,there maybeelements
common to two or more.
Linguistic memes are those weare familiar with through language
interactions. Visual memes are those that are integrally connected with
twoor three dimensional visual representations (these may bepatterns on
moths andbutterflies, designs on American Indian tapestry, international
road sign symbols). Visual memes depend on and evoke activity inthe
'visual* senses. Similarly, musical memes are dependent onthe auditory
senses and cannot be described faithfully viaeither language memes or
visual memes (e.g. bird and whale songs, symphonies, popular tunes).
While one can utilize linguistic memes to describe the procedure with
which to generate visual or musical memes, the linguistic procedure
description will be entirely different from saytheMona Lisa or Beetho
ven's Fifth Symphony.
The information measures useful for our discussion come from
rigorous information theory55, and include measures such as selfinfor-
K
mation Ik =-log^fo) and entropy H - - £ PfaJlqgzPfa) (where ak
is the k-th letter of the alphabet ofKletters, and P(a,J is the probability
ofoccurrenceofthe k-th letter)arequantities that describe unexpectedness
in information, not meaning. Measures that describe value ormeaning of
stringsof lettersaredistinet frominformation-theoreticmeasuresandmust
betreated extremely carefully. Brillouin55distinctly associates value with
possible use by a livingentity. Ultimately, we willaddressvalue in our
discussions. [A temporary hypothesishereis thatvalueis relatedtoentities
further up on the hierarchy of units (not words or lemmas,but certain
collectionsof them)].
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Language is a very broad topic; when reference is made here to
language we restrictour attention to the written manifestation of a very
specific language, namely written modem English. This is not a severe
handicapsincewhatis developed hereappliesbroadlytoanyotherwritten
language(of any age). A valid argument may be made that one needs to
alsoconsiderspokenlanguage. Detailedconsiderationofspokenlanguage
is left for another time. However, one should notice the clear benefit of
using written language, namely the vast amount of real, objective,
empiricaldata available in the form of publishedmaterialof all kinds.
An interesting by-product of this investigation is the potential
applicabilityof languageevolution rules, and replicatordynamicsin the
area of computer systems. Computer languages are after all, highly
stylized languages with very deterministic components. Furthermore,
certain collections of computer instructions exist which fall into the
replicator category (re-usable code can be seen to be a type of passive
replicator,likewisecomputervirusesare a typeof active replicators). The
emerging fields of computer simulations using genetic algorithms, self
programming, true-artificial intelligence and machine intelligence belong
to the class of areas that are derivatives of memetic science.
V.l The Core Program of Memetics.
Initially thecoreprogram ofmemetics is todemonstrate that: 1)ideas
(memes) develop according to certain predictable rules, 2) culture
transmission andspreadofideasofalltypes(inparticular, scientificideas)
embody these rules 3) there is a distinct similarity ofevolution ofmeme
building blocks tothai ofgenetic buildingblocks (which raises theobvious
question of whether language structure is controlled by human genetic
structure), and4) new, unanticipated language andmemestructures can,
andpossibly already do, exist.
The question may arise astothejustification for working with written
language. Many approaches are possible for investigation of replicator
dynamics in language, and language evolution. One reason described in
theintroduction wastheaccessibility ofrobust experimental data. Another
prime reason is that written language embodies a significant degree of
precision.
It is crucial to state, and re-state, that the most accessible memes
available forknowledge representation arelinguistic memes(i.elinguistic
informational replicators) or L-memes. L-memes have syntactical,
grammatical and semantical attributes. The most successful general
implementation ofL-memesisthrough the use ofWritten Modem English
orWME. Studies oflanguage useinscientific publication hasconclusively
shown thatWME is"byfartheprimary languageof international research"
(Garfield57). Similarly, spoken English isthe principal language for verbal
communication between individualsof differing origins, (e.g. English is
theprincipal language for communicationbetween international air-traffic
controllers andpilots). It isclearthatresearch publications constitute one
of the major, if not principal, forms of knowledge documentation. It is
thus quite probable that WME is the principal form of knowledge
representation. However, WME is not necessarily the most efficient or
machine accessible form forknowledge representation andmanipulation.
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Before proceeding, one needs to view the place of written language
in the hierarchy of communication strategies. Communication strategies
for humans may embody any one or more of the physical senses. The
most practical, in terms of their range (both distance and frequency
spectrum) are those based on optical and acoustical strategies. Among
the optical and acoustical communication strategiesone can observe the
following general classes:
i)genera] soundwithwhichit isverydifficulttoassociateprecise meaning
(additionally, a limitedvarietyof differentiable soundscanexist here).
ii) stylized sound such as music. Here again, it is difficult to associate
precise meaning, but distinct differences are possible. In fact an infinity
of variations are possible; many parameters are available to work with
[frequency, amplitude, duration, modulation, simultaneous superposition
of individual patterns,...]
iii) verbal or spoken language. It is easy to associate meaning in
communication usingspoken language, butof ambiguity is still present.
It is normally subject toonesability of recall. Spoken language cannot be
re-examined (thishas improved thiscentury withtheavailability of tape
recorders, which makes re-examination of speech possible for the first
time). Inverbal language, there exists an infinity of sequential assembly
choices of finite extent[limited by number of wordsin a seriesthatcan
beperceived asa unit and can belogically analyzed]. Verbal communi
cation isnot dependent onsensory apparatus tothe extent that it iswithin
certain amplitudeand frequencyranges.
iv)written language. Written language is primarily a visual communica
tion strategy, although it is usually initially based on the learning of a
verbal communication strategy. Here, there exist an infinity of
possibilities. Written language isavailable for re-examination leading to
reduction in ambiguity, and requires less ability for precise recall. This
last feature is crucial since more people can make use of complicated
information relative to verbal communication. Limitations still exist since
complexorlong sequencescanbeunderstood onlybyasmall setofpeople.
v)symboliclanguage. Symboliclanguage isaspecializedsubsetofwritten
language. Here math, physics, music (to name a very few) concepts can
be described precisely and denoted by symbols. Symbolic language is a
result ofconsensus formation (as to thedefinition ofsymbols). Symbolic
language alsooffers an infinity of possibilities withthesame advantages
aswith written language butwith more rigorous intellectual requirements
onusers. Symbolic languageactstolimit thenumberofpeople with access
to the full use of this communication strategy. Note here that computer
languages form a special subset of symbolic language. Computer lan
guagesarequite interestingbecauseofthedegreeofprecision they require.
Computer languages are designed to force different machines (e.g.
electroniccomputers) to execute instruction identically and repeatedly.
An interesting trend in computer software andarchitecture design is the
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developmentof ReducedInstruction Set Computer [RISC] architectures
and improved algorithms that optimize performanceover general purpose
architectures.
And finally,
vi) visual language, as in using motion of limbs, the whole body, other
body parts, or extension of body parts, tools, and flags. Visual language
may includesignlanguage orinterpretive cues.Itshares manysimilarities
with general soundandmusic.However it is limitedby severelimitations
with respect to the numberof distinct concepts/ideas/signals expressible
and receivable. Most beneficial use of visual language is in that often,
gradients invisual flowsarethecuesoneuses forfight/flight information.
An axiom of this paper is thatlanguage is madeup of combinations
ofdiscrete elements. There are anumberofcandidate "atoms" of language.
Written Modem English (WME) is obviously made upof discrete strings
of letters taken out of a finite alphabet of 26 letters, roman or Arabic
numerals, spaces and punctuation symbols. Spoken Modem English
(SME) is recognized by linguists to be made up of a finite number of
elementary sounds known asphonemes. While it is clear that spoken
language appeared beforewritten language, dear correspondences exist
between letter combinations and phonemes. In fact, Sejnowski and
Rosenberg5^ have demonstrated an artificial neural network system,
NETtalk, which can produce speech from textafter algorithmic training
[NETtalk wastrained withthe1000 most common SMEwords, using 29
input nodes and 26 output units]. Another candidate building block is
"molecular" innature whencompared witheither letters orphonemes. The
natural molecular linguistic building block is the morpheme. Linguists
define themorpheme to be the minimal unit of grammatical structure59.
The important feature ofmorphemes isthat agiven morpheme usually has
a dear and constant meaning in all its uses. While morphemes have a
constant WME representation, a given morpheme may vary in its SME
representation (i.e. it mayhavedifferent pronundation).
While morphemes constitute the molecular building blocks (made up
of letters which can be regarded as"atomic" units of WME), there exist
other categorizations of elements of WME. It is particularly worthwhile
toobserve theevolution of categorization in themajor studies of Kucera
and Francis6*61. In their 1967 study, Kucera and Frands listed the relative
frequency of occurrence of overonemillion words(of what isnowknown
as the BrownCorpus orCorpus). Each different manifestation of a word
orsequence ofgraphic symbols(our atoms)wascounted asaunique entity.
By 1982,theCorpus was reanalyzed in termsof unitscalled "lemma" and
"lexeme". A sequence of graphic symbols was recognized asa"graphic
word", where the constraining elements are spaces on either sideof the
sequence of symbols. Each graphic word was assigned a tag indicating
thegrammatical category towhich thegraphic word was assigned. Kucera
and Francis then introduced the"grammatical word" which isthegraphical
word with its tag. The concept of lexical word or "lexeme" was then
introduced. The lexeme is defined as one or more grammatical words
forming alexical unit,withthecriticalaspect that allmanifestation ofthe
lexeme havea unitary meaning. Closely related is thelemma whichis the
setof words having thesame stem/or meaning, and having thesame tag.
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Lemmas can differ in inflection and/or spelling. In their 1982 treatise,
FrandsandKucera providetwo majorfrequency lists; first analphabetical
frequency list of lemmas and then a rank list of lemmas.
Usingthesedefinitions,anL-meme isacombinationof graphicwords.
In some respects,the Francis-Kucera lexeme and the L-meme defined in
this paper are similar, although the lexeme concept does not imply
replication.
There exist a numberof interesting points in regards to WME which
areworthwhiletobringoutat this time. First, some very usefulanddefinite
metrics exist for published WME. Barschall62 recently examined costs per
printedcharacter and impact (frequency with which articles in a given
journal are dted). Barschall found that the average cost per printed
character was the same in three fieldshe examined (physics, philosophy,
mathematics),however costs within a fieldvaried. He also foundthat Rj
the ratioof cost to impact variesbetween 0.063 to 54, with Rj forsdentific
society publications beinglowestandRj forcommercial publishers being
highest.Thesecriteria are beingusedby libraries tohelpdedde onjournal
cancellations, an activity dearly critical in determiningthe rate of spread
of scientificideas (and physical survival of specificjournal meta-memes).
OthermetricsonscientificWME arederived from d tation analyses. These
areused to evaluate and track the impact of sdentific papers, andare at
times used for tenure decisions.
A further justification for restricting the discussion to WME as
opposed to SME, at this point, is the experience attained with automatic
(machine) speech recognition. A significant amount of effort has been
invested inthepast twodecades indeveloping machine speech recognition
(MSR)6"6. The keydifficulties that MSR has tocontend with result from
ambiguity, nongrammaticality, and wide variance in human speech
(between individuals, and in speech of a single individual in different
physical and mental states). MSR specialists havedeveloped multilevel
classification schemes of different kinds. Isolated spoken word recog
nition tasks are considered relatively simple, while connected speech
recognition isquite difficult. A prindpal difficulty withconnected speech
is the recognition of word boundaries. Unrestricted MSR, where the
speakerdoesnotutilizespecial izedvocabulary andanevenspeech pattern
is quite difficult to deal with.
MSR systemstypically utilizeawidevarietyof knowledge about the
speech inuse. Reddy63 discusses phonetics (speech sound characteristics),
phonology (variability in speech sounds), prosodies (speech stress,
rhythm, tempo, pauses, andintonation patterns), lexicon (sound patterns
of words), syntax (grammatical structure) semantics (meaning of words
andsentences), andpragmatics (context of conversation). The possible
variety of these features is at present too large for acceptably accurate
MSR of unrestricted speech. This experience in theMSR arena indicates
the difficulty of constructing algorithms suitable foranalysisand testing
of hypothesis in replicator dynamics of SME samples. This is not to say
thatthereis nothingtogain, in fact SME analysis andtheoryis fasdnating
and more reflective of memetic content in the "mind" or brain. It is the
difficultyandambiguities involved that encourage postponement of this
effortuntil asolidfoundation forWME replicator dynamics isdeveloped.
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V.2 ZipPs Laws of Language.
Over half a century ago, George Zipf undertook a comprehensive
examinationof statistical regularities of language. Due tohis encyclopedic
treatment of many aspects of language, few people are aware of the key
features of his two treatises "The Psycho-Biology of Language"24 and
"Human Behavior and the Prindple of Least Effort"41. While many of
Zipfs concepts ultimately require refinement, a set of his observations
calls for restatement here.
According to Zipf(and borneby manystatistical tests),word length
and frequency of occurrence of words are dosely related. In particular
increased frequency of word use is correlated with shorter words (i.e.
smallerlettercounts).Zipfregarded wordlengthasoneofthemoststriking
differentiating features. However, he did not ascribe the frequency of
occurrence to wordlength.In his investigations he cameacrossa goodfit
to the mathematical formula:
ab2 = k (9)
wherea is thenumber of wordsof a givenoccurrence, b is the number of
occurrencesof these words and k is a constant. Zipf acknowledged this
lawtobevalidforthelessfrequently occurringwords, withtheantidpation
that thislaw would be applicable to 95%of the(different words) of any
given sample.
Afternumerous empirical curvefittings to largeamounts of textual
material, Zipf enunciated what is now known as ZipPs Law 2^21,56*67:
PM'J (10)
where p(r) is theprobability ofoccurrence of ther-th word incommonness
andA isa constant (which for reasonably sized samples =0.1). Mandel
brot2*21 has shown that Zipfs law (eq. 10) can be derived from first
prindples. Mandelbrot shows that ifone assumes that language isa finite
Markov chain process (where after-effects of events have a short per
sistence time), the exactrank-frequency relationship emerges:
pW-PiB-l^-^r+Vy (11)
where P, B andV are constants. Oneobtains equation 2 uponsettingP =
0.1, V =0 andB = 1.(An interesting aside that Mandelbrot points outis
that Markov originated his stochastic approach to model linguistic
processes).
V J Information Theory, Entropy, and Channel Capacity.
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The concept of informationand entropy in communicationtheoryas
introduced by Shannon19,55,56'67 is not the same as the one utilized in
thermodynamics and physicsin general.Entropyin physicsrepresents a
measure of disorder. In assodation with physical processes entropy
remains the same or increases (third low of thermodynamics), while in
informationexchange processes(e.g. communication)entropydecreases.
Clearlythere is a difference in the twoconstructs which requires darifi-
cationsince bothphysical and information entropyare of use to us in this
investigation. Brillouin devotes anentire book56 to this topic. We adopt
Brillouin's terminology here.
Negentropy is a measure which reveals the possibility of a system
doing work. Typically a system which has constituents at different
temperaturescanbeusedtodowork,andissaidtocontainacertainamount
of negentropy. Negentropy (N) is related to physical entropy S by the
relation N = -S. Typically, corresponding to an increase of tsq heat, the
entropy in a system increases by
£S~&q/T (12)
where T is the absolute temperature of the system (degrees Kelvin).
Physical entropy S can also be interpreted statistically (asoriginated by
Boltzman) in termsof the Boltzmanformula:
S=*lnQ (13)
where k is Boltzman's constant (138xl016 ergsperdegree centigrade)
and Q is the number states the system can be in (given its constituent
elements anditstotal energy). Theform of equation 4 is rather similar to
the form utilized in information-theoretic entropy, and it is diredly the
source of much confusion. The Shannon information entropy is in fact
directly related to(and insome cases identical to) negentropy (-S).
Brillouin categorizes information intoseveral kinds. Free information
If occurs when the possible states ofa message areabstract (e.g. in the
mindofanobserver)whereasbound information Loccurswhen itisrelated
to physical manifestations. In this formalism, bound information is a
special case offree information and itisbound information that isrelated
toentropy (ornegentropy). A typical example ofBrillouin's definitions
in our context is given below,
A.A person possesses information (free information).
B. Hewrites it down(bound information on paper)
C. He transmits it via a telefax machine (bound information,
subject to coding/decoding and transmission errors).
D. Fax is receivedat destination and printed on paper (bound
information).
E. Another person readsthefax (freeinformation).
F.Thereader forgets some information (lossoffree information).
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In thisexample there isan opportunityfor lossof informationat every
step of the process with the best case being no loss of information; the
stepswhere we are dealingwith bound informationcan be connectedwith
physical entropy. Note that there are a variety of physical mechanisms
with which WME information can be obtained. Consider optical means
(readingwith eyes), Braille reading(mechanical),computerscanning and
voicingof text(optical/electrical/acoustical), anotherpersonreadingto us
(optical/acoustic generation of speech). All these phenomena involve
physical energyand entropy.Note, however, that entropycosts are low
due to the minute value of Boltzman's constant. Thus, information
exchanged physically can still take place and not impact macro-entropy
directly.
A key information theoretic concept is that of channel capadty and
limitson information transferthrougha communication channel.Shannon
and Weaver40 conceive of an information communication system as
composed of an information source (which generates a message), a
transmitter (whichsendsasignalcarryingthemessage), a communication
channel (on which a noise source may act), a receiver (which receives a
signal and translates it into a received message) and a destination. The
message may be words, music, images, et cetera.
A channel is fundamentally characterized by the amount of infor
mationit can transmit per unit time.The key question in information and
communication theory is what are the limits on information transfer for
arbitrary(or specific)communication channels, with givennoisesources
andmessage generators. Usingthe definition of channel capacity as:
C = Lim
\QgN(T)
T (14)
whereN(T)is thenumber of messages ofduration T,Shannon established
thefundamental theorem fordiscrete noiselesschannels, namely that given
a symbol source of entropy H (bits per symbol) and a channel with a
capacityC (bitsper second),then:
/. It ispossible toencode the output ofthe source insuch a way
as totransmit attheaveragerateofC/H - e symbolspersecond
overthischannel (with e arbitrarily small).
ii. it is not possible to transmit at anaverage rate greater than
C/H.
Inthecaseofcontinuous information (messages) andcommunication
channels, andinthepresenceofnoise, therateofbinary digit transmission
canbeshow to begoverned by the following channel capacity:
Wlog^l+J) (15)
where W is the frequency bandwidth of thechannel, P is average power
used in transmitting thesignal and N is the average (band limited white
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thermal) noise power. [Recall heretherelevancy oftheNyquist sampling
theoremthatsays thata band limitedsignal,withfrequency range0 toW,
and duration T, can be completely spedfied by 2TW numbers].
With the aid of Shannon's theorems, one can revisit earlier made
claims about effidency of communication strategies which were con
cernedwith the improved effidency of opticaland acoustical communi
cationstrategies. It isdear herethatopticalcommunication strategies are
optimal forhumans (andotherbiological organisms), ifa largeamount of
information needs to be communicated (note, we are not discussing the
value of information in this context). We take (conservatively) the lower
limit to human audition as a frequency of 0 Hertz, and the upper limit as
31.5 kiloHertz(based on the upper limit spedfied in OSHA regulations),
with ambientnoise being characterized as 35 dBA for areas requiring
extreme quiet, and 100 dBA as the maximumtolerable human acoustic
input (whichis alreadyabovesafety limits). Thesenumbers can be used
to establish a maximum acoustic information channel input rate as 31500
logj(l + 100/35) per ear.
The correspondingoptical limitscan beconstructed as follows:human
visible range is approximately from 400 to 700 nanometers (violet to red).
This corresponds tofrequendes of4.2-7.5 x 1014 Hertz, and abandwidth
of approximately 3.3x 1014 Hertz. Even with marginal signal to noise
performance, it isdear that thevisualcommunication channelcansupport
significantlyhigherinformation transferratesover theacoustical. Thisby
itself, is a dear reason why written/visual based systems are better than
acoustically based systems, and why cultures based on optical systems
will outperformand outdistanceacousticallybased systems.
V.4 L-memes, WME, Meaning and Knowledge.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is dear that memes possess
two key attributes. Accordingly,a more suitable definition for L-memes
in the context of knowledge representation is:
Definition 2:A memeisaninformational replicatorwhoseprincipal
attributesare pattern and meaning.
Definition 2 is a rather abstract definition of a meme. What is
important to recognize here is that no dependencies are assumed or
requiredonthephysical mediaviawhicha memeisexpressed or onwhich
itis recorded. Forexample, considerthefollowingstringof letters inquotes
"to be or not to be, that is the question". This meme[call it WSj] canbe
understood when it is heard (acoustic encoding in air) or when read
(material encoding inprintandlight/printedpageinteractions). Thememe
can reside in someone's neuronal drcuitry, as a pattern of pits on a
CD-ROM disk, or in magnetized domainson a floppydisk. Replication
of thememeWS,occurswhenwe makea photocopy of a pagecontaining
it, or a copy of the diskette or file in which it resides, and when we redte
it or read it into RAM. WS] is easily seen to be composedof the memes
"to", "be", "or", "not", "that", "is", "the", and "question". Obviously these
eight 'simple' memesare insome waysless profoundthanWS!. However,
they can still be regarded as memes (and in fact more successful memes
than WS, since they get replicated more frequently).
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It is now useful to embarkon a strategyto investigate collections of
simplememes. Todosoweneedtodefinethetermslexiconanddidionary.
A lexicon is a collection of lexicalwords or lexemes.A dictionary is an
ordered set of graphic words with associated definitions. The associated
definitions are serially ordered collections of other graphic word entries
in the didionary. Dictionaries can be static (i.e. have a fixed number of
entries for all times), or dynamic ( new entries being added in order to
improvedidionary and languageeffidency). In WME,graphicwordsare
ordered strings made up of the letters of the English alphabet {a,..,z} &
{A,..,Z}, the Arabicnumerals{0,..,9}and thedements of {-,', 'space'}.
If we designate the i-th didionary entry (graphic word) as w,, then an
L-memecanbe regardedasa particularorderedcollectionofgraphicwords
which canbe denoted by Ma= {w,, w,2w,3wa4 w8„ }. The subscript
n indicates the nth meme and the subscripts l..m denote word order. The
wBj's may beanyof thedidionaryentries. Othersymbols maybedefined
using the basic WME graphic words.
Welook now fordirectly measurable quantities on L-memes in WME.
Some very basic metrics are word counts and letter counts. Denote by
WC(M,) the word count of the meme M,,and by LC(wlk) the lettercount
of word wik. Consider now the meme Mj. The letter density [average
numberof letters per word of Mj] is:
PM) 1
»C(V,)
WCM) & LC(Wii)' (16)
One can calculate metrics on memes constructed from constituent
memes. Consider the two memes M, and M,; one can construct a meme
by concatenation, namely M,= M, ® H- Theword counts addalgebra
ically, i.e., WC(M.) = WC(Mr) + WC(M.). With theaidofequation (16)
it is provable that:
Pl(M,)<Pl(M,)+Pl(K)- (17)
It is useful to construct entropy measures on memes. The Shannon
information entropy template, H=-2 {Probability} log{Probability} can
be extended to memes by considering the probability of WME word
occurrences. With the use of P(w(j) as the probability of occurrence of
word Wi,, thememe entropy isdefined as:
wo/*,)
H<Md— I ^K)log(PK)).
/-i
(18)
It canbe easily shown then that meme entropies are additive, i.e.,
H(M,) =//(A/,)+//(A/,). The calculation of entropies of memes in KIPs
forms a fruitful area of research. The probabilities of individual words
depend onthe frequency distributionofwords inthe total corpusofwritten
recordsat the time the calculation takes place. As soon as new text is
recorded, the total corpus expands, allowing shiftsof frequency distrib
utions, andconsequently changing meme entropies. Thusevenfora fixed
memethe entropyof the meme can changein time.Furthermore, as new
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words are created, entropies can change as well. This is where the
substantive and interesting aspects of memetics begin to manifest them
selves.
The notion of meaning is very important and complicated. Ulti
mately,meaningmustenterifwearetocorrectlydescribememeticspread.
Here, we only sketch the beginnings of a constructiveworking [not final]
definition. To define meaningone starts with dictionaries. A dictionary
D(t) is a timedependent 'macro' L-meme. The particular ordering of the
singlewordL-meme entriesinD(t)withassodateddefinitions [composed
of L-memeentries inD(t)]is thesemantic networkthatembeds meaning
in the particular connections of the associated definitions. This is
essentially an obvious statement of consensus embedding of 'meaning'.
Thedifficulty ofgenerally applying theconceptofmeaning liesinthefad
that one has to search for 'meaning' in arbitraryL-memes, ratherthan in
a codified [printed] single entrydidionary JD(t). Anoperational meaning
of an arbitrary L-meme is obtained by decomposing the arbitrary meme
into thesmallestnumberof multi-word sub-memesand indudng a virtual
didionaryon thesub-memes. Theeffedive [operational] meaning is then
thesequence of meaning imparted by theinduced virtual dictionary.
It is this virtual didionary aspect that poses the problem and the
inherent diversitiesand mutations that can occur. The decomposition of
a complex L-meme intoconstituent sub-memes is a contextually depen
dent constructive procedure that changes value when either a specific
context embeddingchangesorwhenthedidionarieschange. Additionally,
the virtual didionary is usually a purelymental, not a WME, construct
whichis not recorded anywhere (hence, no consensus procedures could
be applied, nor would there be time or resources to document virtual
didionariesof all the KIPsinteractingwith the arbitraryL-memechosen).
When particularly useful complex L-memes recur, didionary changes
occur. These can be regarded as a meme-mutation to allow effident
[Huffman - like] encoding oflong compound memes into single word or
low wordcount memes. It can be seen that the entropies assodated with
new memesare lower than thoseof the definitions.Finally,it is dear that
meanings are functions of the 'knowledge systems' that exercise thdr
particular KIPs. Therefore, there is the high likelihood that different
'knowledgesystems' will impartdifferent meaningstothesame[complex]
L-memes.
While 'meaning' is difficult todefine unambiguously, thenotion of
conceptset is more reachable. Thereason onewants todefine concepts
is that memes reproduce, ingeneral, with a certain amount of mutation,
yet they retain their meaning; ingeneral cultural analysis one ultimately
wishes to deal with the replication of general systems of belief or
knowledge rather than belimited tospecific instances. Thus, it is useful
to definethe concept set S,as the set of all memes {My} havingthe
samemeaning. Furthermore, there isa particularly important L-meme in
S|called theunderlying concept. The underiying conceptC,isdefined
as the first, lowest complexity element of S,. A practical measure of
complexity isthe one ofTraub etAl67.
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It is possible now to define structurescalled theories. Theoriesare
constructed as ordered collections of concepts. A uniquely important
theory is the idealtheory which is the ordered collection ofunderlying
concepts, i.e^ QltK - {UNDERLYINGSONCEPTS,^ - {C/(JC}. Typical
underlying concepts that would occur in ideal theories indude: 1) rules of
combining CI(K, 2) didionary definitions, 3) hypotheses andtheorems, 4)
axioms, and 5) auxiliary terms. Ultimately, theories (which are loose
connections of concepts) evolve and combine to become ideal theories
expressed in terms of underlyingconcepts.
V.5 Knowledge Systems, Knowledge Acquisition, Learning
and Discovery.
It is dear that when there exist interactions or transactions between
knowledge agents,a knowledge systemisoperative. Ageneral knowledge
system(KS) is a systemcomposed of a memory subsystem, a knowledge
acquisition subsystem, a knowledge processing subsystem and an
input/output subsystem. These subsystems individually andcollectively
engage in KIPsandrequire knowledge representation (KR)capabilities.
A knowledge system is usually a computer basedelectronic system or
human based system [with one or more human agents]. Two principal
mechanisms of knowledge acquisition by independent systems are
learning and independent discovery. Learning can be shown to be a
particularcaseofmeme-replicatorspreading. Discovery ischaraderized
asapplication of KIP rulesto knowledge entities already acquired by the
knowledge system. A measure thatcharaderizes a knowledge system is
total knowledge. When two or more independent, dissimilar knowledge
systems interact, total knowledge of the combined system can increase
andbelarger than thesumof theindividual non-interading systems. The
onlyway for total knowledge to increase through interaction of twoor
more KSs is to have copying [read - replication] of knowledge between
systems and knowledge combination (new meme construction). Rein
forcement (i.e.copying of knowledge already present inboth systems) is
something that can and is usually accounted for. In KSs that allow for
value-assessment, an L-meme thatis reinforced byan objective KIPwill
usually have greater value. Advanced KSs may have rather developed
mechanisms for discovery, in this case, there typically arebuilt-in reward
functions for construction of theories and ideal theories.
Computer viruses satisfy theconditions of being replicators. When
regarded as symbolic codes, computer viruses alsosatisfy the condition
of being electronic memes that can mutate in a way similar to general
meme replicators. These electronic memes can then also bedescribed by
theequations expressing meme mutation andspread. Meme mutations
arereflected inchange ofdimensionality of thememe phase space which
is used for knowledgerepresentation.
TheL-memes discussed here started with an implidtassumption of
'atomic' or fundamental units. Combination of primitive memes yield
complex memes. A sequence of increasing complexity memes is: sen
tences, paragraphs, chapters, books,librariesetc.Withregard tocomputer
oriented replicators, one can look at hierarchical levels of data record
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entries, records, databases, collection of databases, machine level
instructions through highlevellanguages andpseudo-codes. Allthesecan
be interpreted via the memeformalism.
In this context one needs to mention that the replication aspectsof
L-memes are precisely those that are required to formulate a basis of
evolvingartificial intelligence. The conceptsof replicators and memes
have been shown to be of highvalue in describinggrowth, mutation, and
selection processes in biological and ecological systems. As interacting
AI(Artifidal Intelligence) systemsbecomecapableof learningfromother
systems along with the informational environment (in a non-trivial
manner), the calculus of concept acquisition and knowledge acquisition
will require the type of knowledge replication and spread calculus
described here.
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Figure 2 - Trajedory representation of the meme "to be or not
to be". The ordinate entries are the rank ordered lemmas of the
Brown Corpus, theabsdssa entries are thememe [word] entries
according to their sequential order of occurrence in the meme.
V.6 Memetic Phase Space.
Oneof themorepowerful techniques forvisualizingorganization and
development is the use of phase-space descriptions. In section V.4 the
syntadic form for denotinga memewas introduced. In order to describe
memesviathephase-spaceapproach, a particularorderingofbasicmemes
is required. Wewill initiallyadopt theword-rankingcalculatedby Frands
and Kucera in theirmostrecentre-analysis of theBrownCorpus[ref.61].
The basic L-meme building blocks used will be the lemma (where, for
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example, 'be', 'am', 'are' and 'art' are different inflections of the lemma
'be', while theL-meme 'to' hastwotags: thefirst onebeing a being an
infinitive mark 'to,'and thesecond 'tOj' being a preposition).
The ordinate axis of the memetic phase plane is constructed by
enumerating theFrancis-Kucera lemmas according to their ranked [ad
justed] frequency of occurrence [in theCorpus]. Thusthe null-lemma or
null-meme is represented by theordinate valueO, thelemma 'the' (which
is themost frequent word in theCorpus [and in theEnglish Language])
has rank land ordinate value 1, etc. Theabsdssa denotes the serial location
of occurrence of a particular lemma in an arbitrary L-meme. Toillustrate
the construction of a meme phase-space portrait, consider the L-meme
'to be or not to be'. The lemma 'to' appears in the first and fifth serial
location of the meme, 'be' occurs in the second and sixth locations, etc.
One couldalso use the syntadical description [8,2,29,16,8,2]to describe
'to be or not to be' unambiguously. The pidorial representationof 'to be
or not to be' is given in figure 2.
A veryinterestingfeatureof describingL-memesvia thisphase-space
approach is the immediacy of entropy/Information calculation. By
combining equation 18 and Zipfs Law (equation 10), and notidng that
the ordinate value of the i-th lemmain an L-memeis the rank required as
input into Zipfs Law, a Zipf-information measure can be calculated for
arbitrary L-memes, namely:
wcwa A
i-\ r r
(19)
Thus,one has a directly calculableinformation measure. From this
discussionone noticessome interestingtopicsforfutureresearch,namely:
i) thecomparisonof the Zipf-information to the true informationvalueof
a meme (which takes into account all WME in existence), and ii) the
samplingbasedestimation of true WMEentropies, given thatin realityit
is impossible to have access and summarize the totality of all written
material in WME.
V.7 Memetic Hierarchies.
In dosing thissedion on language basedmemes, onemustmention
that thereare obviouslyhierarchiesof memes.In the mannerthat one can
regard hierarchies in biological organization andsodety, one hasequiv
alent scales of hierarchies in memetic structures. Table 1 provides a
summary hierarchy tabulation for four categories of entitiesand rough
correspondences. In this context, we use L&W's4 term euculture "..
advanced form of culture, in which individuals not only teach and learn
information, but alsoconceptualize muchof it into concreteentities that
can be more readily labeled by symbols and handledby language."
We also introduce here the concepts of trans-culture and Homo
trans-sapiens (or simply trans-sapiens). While being topics of a future
paper, trans-culture canbedescribed as thenextstepofculture dominated
by deep connections, interactions, and relationships between objects
created by large human/machine teams. A manifest propertyof trans-
culture is the extreme and transcendent complexity of interactions and
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relations between humans and the cultural objects involved, with the
additional property of being non-accessible toHomo sapiens. Examples
of trans-cultural objects already exist; forexample, thereis noindividual
who(atanygiven temporal instance) isanexpert inallaspects ofmedidne,
orwhois familiar with allbiological spedesandthdr relationships, or is
anexpert inallaspectsofphysics, orwhoistotally familiarwithallaspects
ofevenasinglecultural artifad(e.g.Hubblespacetelescope, SpaceShuttle
design, or the total design of a nuclear power plant). In fad, we are
approaching the point that certain proofs of mathematical theorems are
becomingtoolonganddifficultforanyoneindividual to keepinconsdous
awareness. In a way, these transcendent and extended complexity rela
tionshipsare examplesof morecomplicated 'meta-memes',whichis one
of the reasons it is interestingto study the evolutionof ideas.
Ecological
Sequence
Cultural
Sequence
Homo
Sequence
Memetic
Sequence
atoms no culture no human letters
molecules morphemes
chains proto culture proto human words
cells parts of
sentences
organs culture Homosapiens sentences
individuals paragraphs
spedes euculture chapters
ecologies books
grand ecolo
gies
libraries
trans
ecologies
trans-
culture
Homo trans-
sapiens
hypertexts,
hypemets,
electronic mega-
databases
Table 1. Hierarchies in biological organization,cultural evolu
tion, human evolution, and memetic complexity/organization.
The correspondences are roughat this point.
Homotrans-sapiens is the [postulated] nextstepinevolution of homo
sapiens. There is no reason to expect or require that Homo sapiens will
not undergo further evolution. The bio-historical trend indicates that the
major evolutionary development in Homo is in the cortico-neural arena
(i.e. increasingly more complexorganization of the nervoussystemand
the brain). Spedfically it is the higher level cognitive-KIP functions that
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set H. sapiens apart. It is asserted here (and to be discussed in a future
paper) that H. trans-sapiens is a logical consequence of evolution, and
that the milieu and adaptive epigenetic landscape for//, trans-sapiens is
already present in the form of trans-culture. It is indeed possible that the
basicmutations areinplaceandtrans-sapiensalreadyexistsorwillappear
in the biologically-near time frame.
VI. Memetic Spread Equations.
Earlier,memeswerearguedtobea particularcaseofreplicators. Basic
replicator equations were discussed and a representative case of two
spedes predator-prey was articulated (equation 7). Unfortunately, the
previously discussed replicator equations [section IVandreferences 4,12,
15-18, 28] are not sufficiently developed to yield practical results that
supportand extendthe memeticcore program (sectionV.l).
Weassume that thecontext of discussion is that wehave a large set
(or population) of Knowledge Systems. If we denote by KS,- the i-th
Knowledge System, and regard it as being composed of {Input/Output
channels, Memory Store [that stores memes received through the I/O
channels as well as memes generated internally, and also stores other
internally or externally generated sense traces], and a Processor that
executes knowledge/information processes [KIPs]}, we can pose the
following quantitative questions regarding meme evolution and spread:
Q.l: Given that ameme M,originates inKnowledge System KS„
when does thememe M, arrive atanarbitrary KS,?
Q.2: Given a state configuration of all Knowledge Systems at
time t (i.e., a detailed description ofthe memory store ofall
KSs), what is the state configuration of the KSs at some
future time t*=t+ n&t (i.e. n time intervals later)?
Q3: How many, and which KSs accept meme M; as 'true'?
Inorder to answer these questions aninteraction model is required.
Reasonable starting points arethefollowing ansatzs:
A.1: When two Knowledge Systems KS, and KS, are withinsome
'distance' d,j from each other they will communicate (or
interact) spontaneously at some time, with increasing
probability as timegoeson.
A.2: The relative probability that a particular meme Mk is
communicated byKSj depends on the internal complexity
of the meme, its relative acceptance state,and the number
of times KS, received the meme.
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A3: Any meme or set of memes can undergo mutations and
combinations. These mutations/combinations are internal
KIPs of a Knowledge System.
A.1 is usually evident when the KSs are humans and the mode of
interaction is speech (e.g., SME). For example, when two adult humans
comewithinsome thresholdgeometricaldistance, the probabilitythatthey
will interact will grow with time and increase with decreasing distance.
A probability of interaction between KS, and KSy can thusbe written as:
Pl^C^,t"\ (20)
Here the parameters ml and m2 need to be determined by dimensional
analysis; Q and a are constants. Note that at this time no particular
assumption is made concerning the number of connections between
Knowledge Systems, norisany linear, planar, hyper-linear or hypercubic
assumptionmade.Itwillbe useful laterontoimposeparticulargeometries,
such as linearchainsor Isingspin typemodels, tomakeactualcalculations
tractable.
One can express the relativeprobabilitiesreferredto in A.2 usingthe
partition function formalism of statistical mechanics. The relative prob
abilityof memeMk beingcommunicated can thenbe givenas:
P,
w,e
-HfiT
lw(e -HJkT'
(21)
where Hj incorporates acomplexity metricandotherenergy costs, andthe
weighting fador w, incorporates the relative acceptance state (accep
ted/believed, rejeded asfalse, nojudgement,etc.)andthenumberoftimes
aparticular Knowledge System has been exposed tothe meme inquestion.
Theconstant k is Boltzman's constant while T is a parameter that plays
the role of temperature, and represents internal noise or fluctuations
internal toandexternal to theKnowledge Systems.
A.3 is a general statement reflecting the evolutionary aspects
underlying allofmodem biological thought. Itspractical application with
respect tostrings of symbols is manifested in Holland's development of
theories ofadaptation innatural and artificial systems and the particular
implementations in the Genetic Algorithm techniques for solution of
search problems w.
Equations 20 and 21, and the realizations of suitable mutations are
the elements required for proper meme spread equations. Theauthor's
paper "Memetic Science: II- Meme Spread Equations"70, inthenext issue
ofJ ofI,will present the next step inthe development of these equations.
There, the formalism of the Einstein A and B coefficients forderiving
probabilitiesofspontaneousandstimulatedtransitionswillalsobe utilized
in the struduring of the memetic formalism. This approach will allow
accounting for both learning (stimulated transition) and discovery
(spontaneous transition) in terms of the metrics on memes discussed in
section V.
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